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1. Introduction
In this paper we define a number of key concepts which are central to our understanding of the
processes of micro and small enterprise behaviour and dynamics, with special attention being
paid to highlighting the more common types of transaction costs in the products, credit and
labour markets. The definition of these terms culminates into the design of an analytical
(
framework which is couched within the transaction and information costs economics micro- 
theoretic perspective meant to illuminate or explain the processes of micro and small scale 
enterprise behaviour and dynamics. The latter is achieved by establishing conceptually a link 
between institutions, transaction costs and the processes of micro and small scale enterprise 
behaviour and dynamics. Our next task is to point out at some of the few organizational 
institutional arrangements that can be designed or adjusted and then utilized to minimize the 
adverse impacts of these various transaction and information costs on the processes o f micro 
and small enterprise growth and survival in the areas of micro-finance, marketing, skills 
training and contract enforcement. In some of the latter cases we will be drawing heavily from 
a few selected examples of such institutions from one of the East Asian NICs that were put 
into test and found to be effective in overcoming some of these constraints in the products, 
credit and labour markets. It is also our contention that it is only through the joint concerted 
efforts of both the government and other private sector groups who are in a position to help in 
changing positively the nature and form of these transaction and information costs by either 
adjusting existing institutions so that they can function better or can create new ones to fill in 
the existing institutional vacuum and therefore can go a long way towards meeting the 
objective of genuinely empowering the intended beneficiaries.
2. The Bounded Rationality Conundrum
The term bounded rationality can be taken to mean behaviour that is intendedly rational. In 
other words, it means that the economic agent's rationality to some certain extent is limited 
and therefore is confronted with the so called "competence-difficulty gap", which is a gap 
between the economic agent's competence and the degree o f complexity o f the problems (s)he 
is expected to grapple with. The greater is the gap, the more difficulty it becomes for the 
economic agent to come up with the best solution to his or her problem(s), instead more 
mistakes will be the outcome rather than solutions the more (s)he attempts to solve the 
problems(Knudsen, 1993). O f course in some developing country situations, including our 
own Zimbabwean situation, the competence-difficulty gap can be equated to outright 
"ignorance" on the part o f the economic agent(s) emanating not only from the informational, 
limited memory and computational problems but also from uncertainty arising from the 
language problem that may prevent perfect communication o f those things that are known or 
should be known, breeding the much observed and talked about lack o f knowledge amongst 
these micro and small scale entrepreneurs. For example, to cite just one good example, all 
bank loan application forms in Zimbabwe, in addition to being complex in terms o f the details 
required to be filled in and the legalistic type o f language used, are all written in english and 
must be filled out in english and some other rigid bank formalities must be adhered to as well. 
The same holds also for many other government official documents, rules and regulations, 
regardless of the well known fact that micro and small scale entrepreneurs constitute the bulk 
of the least educated members o f our society and therefore the majority o f them are illiterate 
or semi-illiterate. As a consequence many o f these entrepreneurs are not likely to be familiar 
with these complex rules and procedures as well as how to execute complex contracting tasks. 
In general, therefore without the aid o f the indigenous languages, micro and small scale 
entrepreneurs are not in a position to eloquently articulate their problems and effectively 
communicate with bank officials, distributors, input suppliers, NGO officials, government 
officials, etc. Instead, fieldwork experiences show that they are actually scared to confront 
these elitist groups o f people with their business problems and demands and by all possible 
means try to avoid meeting them. Some entrepreneurs, basing on the comments they made
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during our fieldwork discussions treat it as a shear waste o f time since they are already 
convinced that nothing positive will come out of it. And in terms o f exchange relationships this 
type of problem, that is bounded rationality, therefore, makes it impossible for parties to an 
exchange to sign long-term comprehensive contracts, the so called state contingent contracts 
which permits them to specify in advance exchanges to be executed in all conceivable 
contingencies that may occur in the future and at the same time clearly specifying all the 
obligations of each party to an exchange, for example what should be done if a customer fails 
to pay on an agreed date; if the entrepreneur fails to fulfil an important order; an employee 
fails to turn up for work because (s)he had to attend to a funeral or was sick or if the employer 
fails to pay his or her employees as per agreement, etc. In a typical developing country 
situation, like Zimbabwe besides the language problems, this limited competence o f micro and 
small entrepreneurs to completely specify their contracts is due to and is further exarcebated 
by the fact that the distortions that characterize many developing country product and factor 
markets makes them poor providers o f information. Information concerning the prices, 
quantities, and qualities o f goods and factors o f production is usually non-existent. The costs 
of generating and disseminating such information are exorbitant. Hence state contingent 
contracting is very difficult to undertake. Instead these informational problems leaves the 
micro or small scale entrepreneur vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour o f both the ex ante 
and ex post type, that is opportunism resulting from adverse selection(hidden information) and 
moral hazard(hidden action) respectively. But the recognition that the economic agent's 
competence is limited leaves room for the renegotiation o f most contracts and the use of 
alternative contractual or institutional arrangements, for example the contract can be left 
incompletely specified, in order to minimize the adverse effects o f  bounded rationality. 
Leaving the contract incomplete, however, means that contract enforcement problems that are 
in most cases even more costly to the enterprise, will inevitably arise in the future due either to 
unavoidable or opportunistic breach. Therefore, in general, for most rural micro or small scale 
entrepreneurs the majority o f their business transactions are still being carried out in a high risk 
contracting environment which is characterised by doubt, ignorance and mistrust where either 
opportunistic or unavoidable contractual breach is the norm rather than the exception. Under 
normal circumstances, therefore, bounded rationality results in two types o f transaction costs;
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viz the costs to each party o f anticipating the various eventualities that may occur during the 
life of the relationship and the cost of deciding and reaching an agreement on how to deal with 
such eventualities once they occur. We also want to emphasis that in addition to imperfect 
communication problems, in general the costs o f information gathering and therefore the 
overall transaction costs incurred by micro and small scale entrepreneurs in the products, 
credit and labour markets is also negatively correlated with each entrepreneur's level of 
literacy or illiteracy.
3. Transaction Costs Types
3.1. Products Market Transaction Costs
Given the above trading uncertainties through the market and the inevitably to arise 
opportunistic behaviour by other transacting economic agents due to the above cited 
incomplete or distorted disclosure o f information with the objective o f making some economic 
gain, most o f the micro or small scale enterprise's transaction costs in the products market 
must emanate from the trading costs sub-category of transfer costs which involve the transfer 
of property rights between transacting economic agents through such activities as measuring 
the legal and physical characteristics of a transaction e.g mass, volume, colour, texture, size, 
length, etc, including the knowledge about the true characteristics o f the other party to the 
contract, for example the search costs for information pertaining to the quality o f production 
inputs, products or services that are being offered and the reliability o f the customers or 
suppliers who are either individuals or organizations, the negotiation, monitoring and 
enforcement of contracts, along with a measure o f uncertainty. Some o f these transaction 
costs are partly market costs and therefore, they are direct and can be measured. Amongst this 
group we have got legal and other direct fees, and the various costs involved in organizational 
supervision, coordination, monitoring and metering quality of goods to be exchanged. Some 
other transaction costs, however, are indirect and very difficult to measure1. It is very difficult 
to measure, for example the time spend gathering information, queuing, paying bribes and 
losses due to imperfect monitoring and contract enforcement. Although difficulty to measure, 
with respect to real business transactions, the micro or small scale entrepreneur is exposed to 
various types of transaction costs arising from ex post opportunism as a result o f imperfect
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monitoring and contractual incompleteness, that is contract enforcement difficulties. Firstly, 
this may arise from the costs of forgone profits, arising from a customer's refusal to accept the 
goods once a customized order is finished with the intention possibly to renegotiate the terms 
o f the contract, mostly on the grounds that the goods are o f poor quality or defective. 
Secondly, from the loss of revenue which arises from a customer who, after accepting delivery 
o f the goods refuses to pay him or her because in this case contractual incompleteness gives 
the customer the opportunity to plead cash-flow problems or to delay payment with the 
possibility o f again renegotiating the price down, thus again the delinquent defaulter if  the 
goods are customized finds the opportunity to flex his or her ex post bargaining power. With 
the latter, a lot of time must be devoted to debt follow-ups and loss o f revenue can result from 
cumulative bad debts too. Finally, costs may be incurred that are associated with the breach o f 
contract involving the delivery o f different quality o f products, especially raw materials, than 
that initially specified in the contract. This often happens in situations characterised by low 
volumes o f trust, where again one party to an exchange agreement holds superior information 
pertaining to the goods or services to be exchanged and therefore the degree o f the extend of 
his or her compliance with the terms o f the contract are not guaranteed. Alternatively, this also 
often happens in cases where the input supplier is either a monopolist which creates some kind 
o f bilateral dependence or has a good reputation and the bargaining power o f the micro or 
small scale entrepreneur is limited or generally switching costs may be prohibitive for the 
entrepreneur when it comes to changing suppliers because of the previously incurred learning 
costs that engenders some form of bilateral dependency again. These switching costs must 
therefore be viewed as a form of sunk costs because each time the micro or small entrepreneur 
decides to switch to a new supplier or large customer, resources will have to be again invested 
in evaluating the true characteristics of the new supplier or customer and establishing new 
relationships. Therefore in situations where switching costs are expected to high, past 
experiences and actions are extrapolated and they actually influence future transaction 
decisions. Worse still, micro and small scale entrepreneurs may be forced to pay side payments 
in order to win contracts to supply private sector and government institutions with their goods 
and services. These side payments constitutes bribes and they do escalate the transaction costs 
o f  complying with private and government institutions procurement rules and regulations and
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often keeps micro or small enterprises from bidding for these tenders, even where they may be 
in a position to competently fulfil these contracts.
Another subset o f transfer costs, which is commonly associated with the products market but 
not directly linked to the exchange process itself are the pure transfer costs o f which handling 
and transportation fees are good examples. The group o f transaction costs that seem to be 
easier to measure is that o f transportation costs, middleman service charges and the cost of 
holding inventories o f finished goods, work in progress and raw materials. These costs are 
determined both by the number o f distinct transactions, that is the number or size of orders 
made and the volume o f goods exchanged, hence they can be viewed as variable exchange 
costs. For the micro or small scale entrepreneur, the costs depend on the frequency of travel 
either to buy inputs or sell the enterprise's output and the volumes thereby involved. In terms 
of transaction costs, all this can be collapsed into time and travel expenses. It is important to 
note that for the latter, these costs are indirectly influenced also by the state o f 
telecommunications and the road networks that affect the micro and small scale entrepreneur's 
queuing and waiting time. Exchange costs are bound to be high by adding time, due to delays, 
to both exchange and production activities if communication facilities and roads are non­
existent or are in a dilapidated condition2. However, the cost o f holding inventories, that is 
storage costs, is another category o f transaction costs that can affect the growth and 
performance of the micro or small scale enterprise. The amount o f  inventories the micro or 
small scale entrepreneur must hold is determined by the waiting time which must elapse 
between consecutive transactions, either buying or selling transactions. If the waiting time is 
short, little resources will therefore be committed to inventory and the converse is true. Since 
in most developing countries and Zimbabwe being no exception, transactions take time to be 
executed we expect inventory holding costs to constitute a large proportion o f the micro or 
small scale enterprise's transaction costs, unless the entrepreneur resorts to the use o f other 
innovative transaction costs economizing institutional arrangements, for example production 
on order and therefore mostly using the customer's own raw materials.
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3.2. Labour M arket Transaction Costs
Transaction costs are also incurred in the labour market. With respect to the recruitment 
process o f labour into the micro or small enterprise, fieldwork observations and discussions 
indicated that in Zimbabwe micro or small scale entrepreneurs incur both high search costs and 
bargaining costs in their efforts to find the most suitable and reliable or trustworthy 
employees. In terms of bargaining costs, labour market imperfections and therefore the non­
existence or perennial shortages o f skilled labour in most rural areas implies that the 
entrepreneur has to pay a higher scarcity rent than a large firm or comparable micro or small 
enterprise located in an urban area in order to attract skilled labour into the enterprise. Once 
the employees are recruited, these micro and small scale entrepreneurs often incur some 
output loses due to effort shirking, absenteeism and wasteful use o f raw materials if 
supervision is slack or just from the mere fact that the employees will be generally young and 
inexperienced. Alternatively, employees can deliberately damage production tools and 
equipment. This also often leads to considerable output looses due to work stoppage over and 
above the high maintenance and repair costs. In instances were equipment breakdown can be a 
result of poor or inappropriate technical skills on the part o f the employees, the entrepreneur 
will have to incur both some training and retraining costs in order to minimize these 
breakdowns. The probability is also very high that the employees after gaining enough training 
and experience in the micro or small scale enterprise, they will cancel their employment 
contracts prematurely in search o f "greener pasturers", a factor which makes micro and small 
scale entrepreneurs very reluctant to send their employees for further training since it always 
turns out to be a risky strategy due to the non-enterprise specific nature o f the skills acquired 
during the training period. Employees can also resort to another worst form of ex post 
opportunistic behaviour, that is theft. Therefore what it means is that in all the above cases 
high monitoring costs will have to be borne by the micro or small scale entrepreneur, either by 
spending some o f his time doing the supervision him or herself or someone else must be 
employed to perform the supervisory duties. The latter will cost the enterprise some money 
through increased unit labour costs.
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3.3. Credit M arket Transaction Costs
However, when it comes to the credit market, micro and small scale entrepreneurs in most 
developing countries are notoriously known by financial institutions for their high affinity to 
borrow little amounts of money whilst at the same time they are endowed with relatively little 
borrowing experience. As a consequence financial institutions are very hesitant to lent out 
some money to these entrepreneurs because of the high transaction costs and risks these small 
loans attract. To the lending institutions the costs are usually fixed non-interest expenses 
incurred in evaluating or screening borrowers, disbursing, monitoring and collecting 
repayments3. A huge proportion o f these costs take the form of administrative costs, for 
example wages and office paperwork and default costs in the form o f reserves that must be set 
aside to off-set defaults or accumulated bad debts. It is these costs in most instances that 
compels banks to restrict their lendings to a few large, but low-risk borrowers.
But the entrepreneurs themselves also incurs some costs. In the context o f the Zimbabwean 
situation these borrower transaction costs can be classified into two distinct groups, all of 
which are non-interest expenses incurred by the borrowers. The first set o f costs falls under 
the generic name of service costs and include explicit cash costs that include expenditure on 
travel, entertainment, bribes and gifts, forced purchase o f other lender services or products 
and other expenses connected with the requirements imposed by the lender. Amongst these 
explicit costs financial institutions as rule, based on information gathered during the fieldwork 
period, insist that the following charges associated with the process o f loan application be met 
before final disbursement o f the funds, viz loan application fees, training fees, consultancy 
fees, bond registration fees, insurance policy costs and bank commission in cases where 
security in the form of a bank guarantee is pledged as collateral. For all the fore-mentioned 
costs, with the exception o f the application and bond registration fees which must be paid 
directly by the loan applicant, are built into the loan package. Also, given their limited 
knowledge or ignorance on how the financial system functions most micro and small scale 
entrepreneurs are forced to negotiate their loan demands through a third party before a loan 
application is formally reviewed. In cases where the lending institution is government owned 
or otherwise, such a person may be an extension or project officer who is also expected to
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visit and appraise the entrepreneur's project or the inventory of his current business operation, 
that is, to carry out a qualitative assessment of the project's viability, the overall more 
observable characteristics of the borrower and his business. Hence in order to curry some 
favours and have the loan application speedily processed some borrowers may resort to 
offering gifts or bnbes-vhuranniromo, invitations for lunches and beer drinks and, therefore, 
these can constitute one of the major sources o f the micro or small scale entrepreneur's 
transaction costs in the credit market.
However, in Zimbabwe as in other developing countries, the second group and possibly the 
largest set of transaction costs emanates, as is the case in the products market, is the 
entrepreneur's implicit or opportunity costs of time spend applying for and obtaining the loan, 
that is the opportunity cost of lost production time as well as travel expenses incurred in the 
process of executing the loan transactions. In most cases these costs are positively correlated 
with the number of visits to the bank and therefore tend to increase or decrease depending on 
the duration of the time taken to obtain approval. As a matter o f fact, fieldwork data shows 
that delays in approving or disapproving the loan applications is usually the norm for micro 
and small scale borrowers because they always take their time to submit all the necessary 
requirements which go together with the loan application, for example documents pertaining 
to security pledges in the form o f title deeds and financial statements o f the business, for 
example bank statements and cash flow projections. Therefore, the micro or small scale 
entrepreneur is expected to visit the lending institution several times to negotiate the loan, 
withdraw a certain fraction o f the loan if (s)he is luck to have the application finally approved 
and make some repayments. This actually, in addition to the lost productive time, involves 
travelling long distances and therefore budgeting for transport costs. Worse still, micro or 
small scale borrowers can incur some indirect transaction costs stemming from the perceived 
risk from the lending institution's side emanating from the fact that contract enforcement costs 
will be very costly so the loan application will obviously be turned down regardless o f  the 
viability o f the project. Although under these circumstances the lending institution's contract 
enforcement costs will be simply zero, the micro or small scale borrower will incur a very huge 
cost, that o f the loan not being approved. Prolonged delayed disbursement o f approved loans
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can have almost similar effects. In brief, therefore, it may always turn out to be true that the 
opportunity costs o f formal borrowing are therefore always higher for micro and small 
enterprise borrowers all the time when compared with their large enterprise counterparts.
4. The Institutional Environment4
For the purpose o f this paper, we define the institutional environment as a set o f all formal 
rules, informal rules and their enforcement mechanisms, past and present hence the importance 
o f culture in which society's history is embedded, as well as organizations and their 
entrepreneurs as both rule setters and players o f the game that influences the production, 
exchange and distribution activities in any given economic system. The rules that govern 
property rights and the right o f contract, societal beliefs, norms and values are good examples. 
And these are the rules that structure incentives and help in the regulation o f the behaviour o f 
economic agents. In terms o f organizations we can think o f two major groupings which can 
either be national or sectoral in outlook, namely the formal economic, social and political 
organizations and indigenous organizations. Amongst the most prominent economic 
organizations examples are regulatory agencies, labour bodies, the financial system, private 
intermediary organizations, enterprises, collective action bodies and public action 
organizations. Political organizations encompass the three main organs of the state, viz the 
judiciary, parliament and the executive as well as local and regional authorities. Good 
examples of indigenous organizations are the traditional court system, women's social clubs, 
savings and credit clubs. Whilst under social organizations we have educational and training 
organizations, clubs, religious bodies and professional organizations. All these organizations, 
in one way or the other, play a crucial role in the formulation and enforcement o f formal rules 
and regulations that include laws o f the land, economic policies and strategies, political and 
social rules, technical standards including standards for weights and measures, quality 
standards and contracts. Enforcement o f these rules is done in most cases through the use o f 
the formal courts system. But in some cases it is more economic to rely on out o f court 
dispute enforcement mechanisms, that is resorting to private as opposed to court ordering. On 
the other hand indigenous institutions, both as organizations and culture, also generate their 
own set o f informal rules and enforcement mechanisms which are constituents o f the
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institutional environment and also dictates and therefore structure the behaviour o f economic 
agents. Culture is an all embracing concept meant to capture such informal institutions as 
routines, customs, traditional rules, rites, beliefs, etc, all o f which have their roots in well 
known and recurring behaviour. Both formal and indigenous organizations, besides their rule 
formulation and enforcement tasks, can also be actively involved in the transacting game either 
as active producing economic agents or providers o f institutional support services to other 
economic agents involved in the transacting game. Therefore, the function o f these 
organizations goes beyond merely setting the rules o f the game, but becoming important and 
active players o f the game itself.
However, some further elaboration ought to be made here on the three types o f private 
ordering which are known to exist, viz self-enforcement, bilateral and collective enforcement 
mechanisms. Bilateral contract enforcement mechanisms are mainly concerned with the use 
and threats o f physical violence or coercive force, the role o f  reputational effects, taking or 
exchanging hostages, complaining or voice, threats to terminate or actual termination or 
exiting o f exchange relationships. In most instances, actual use or threat o f use o f physical 
violence is preferred because it makes enforcement threats become more credible. Whilst 
collective contract enforcement mechanisms rely on invoking social sanctions which are 
applied through use o f family and kinships ties, friendship ties, community bonds, ethnicity, 
patronage, etc, and work through ostracism or loosing face by heaping shame on the offending 
individual. Self-enforcing mechanisms depend on contract adherence norms and beliefs or 
generalized trust to restrain opportunism such as honesty behaviour, guilty conscience, 
traditional norms, religious norms, ethical standards, etc. These latter arrangements act as 
mechanisms o f social control and as a guarantee that contractual agreements will be fulfilled 
and are all embedded in a given society's cultural institutions and its people.
It is important to note that if trust5, a highly invisible institution, can be defined as the 
expectations that arises within a given community or society o f regular, honest and co­
operative behaviour based on commonly shared and enforced norms on the part o f other 
economic agents of that community or society, then trust can be taken as part o f a web o f the
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above cited informal rules which constitutes our institutional environment and is also culturally 
induced and therefore must be impregnated with a lot of historical anecdotes. As a result 
(mis)trust can also be said to be path dependent in nature because it is these past historical 
experiences that determine or model individuals’ current political, economic and social 
perceptions. For example bitter memories of past ethnic strive, colonial discriminatory rules, 
regulations and practices which continue to actively shape the current Zimbabwean 
institutional environment can be a source of ever lasting suspicion and mistrust between 
economic agents from different racial and ethnic groups, and between government and private 
entrepreneurs, thus breeding a culture of "low trust" within the whole economic system and 
therefore the much observed dislike of markets, high tensions, suspicions, the seemingly 
unending pulling and dragging in opposite directions, etc. But what we in fact actually need is 
both more trust and more markets not less, because without both it is difficult to imagine how 
mutual cooperation amongst contracting economic agents can be attained and opportunities of 
gainful exchange thereafter to be exploited fully. Hence, we can conclude that (mis)trust also 
resides within the institutional environment and is an important ingredient o f the economic 
system which helps in lubricating or dislubricating exchange relationships, cooling down or 
raising tensions between transacting economic agents by minimizing or maximizing the amount 
friction due to high transaction costs and related sunk costs, generated within a given 
economic system.
In cases where formal rules, for example rules that ensures contract compliance and security of 
property rights, exist and enjoys community or society-wide legitimacy, trust can also be based 
on these formal institutions or it can be induced through professional ethics, or common 
membership o f a business, religious or other community organizations. With the latter it is not 
necessary for economic agents to know each other personally, as in the case o f  friends and 
family members, trust and overall acceptance is generated through certain kinds o f attributes 
or characteristics associated with a given group or community which are imputed to all other 
representatives o f the group or that community(Lyons et al, 1997:246). We can call these, 
group-based traits or characteristics. Ben-Porath(1980) describes this mechanism as equivalent 
to the transitivity o f a "brand name". He suggests that affiliation to recognised groups, such as
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the family, the local church or local business community signals traits such as honesty, fidelity 
or skill(s) which are very important ingredients of the institutional environment. But 
unfortunately, the same group traits can also act as a powerful tool for statistical 
discrimination or group exclusion when it comes to real contracting. Alternatively, the 
development of formal means o f ensuring contract compliance, for example an effective legal 
systems and the relative reliability of institutionalised trust mechanisms, for example credit 
rating bureaus, business information bureaus, national standardised weights and measures, 
international quality standards for example the use of IS09000, employment agencies, etc, 
also reduce the need to rely on personal knowledge and trust of exchange partners and, 
therefore, can facilitate impersonal exchange through the price mechanism and specialization, 
thereby increasing one's contracting opportunities as long as the latter institutions can be relied 
upon and all contracting parties will have confidence in them.
5. The Link
With all the conceptual tools we have developed so far it becomes much easier to envisage a 
composite analytical framework that links institutions, transaction costs, the micro or small 
scale enterprise's contracting and networking behaviour, organizational choice and its 
dynamics at the micro level. This analytical framework which is based the Northian- 
Williamsonian macro-micro link and is a further extension o f the Alston model(1994) is crucial 
to our further understanding o f the determinants o f the firm's decision making processes, 
contracting behaviour, contract choices, choice o f investment activities and strategies, 
organizational structure, other related institutional arrangements that may be adopted by the 
micro or small scale entrepreneur including the observed industry firmsize distribution. And at 
the same time we explicitly recognize the special transaction and information cost economizing 
potential or function o f public and private sector formal organizational institutions and 
indigenous or informal organizational institutions, trust and social networks. By so doing with 
respect to the latter variables we, therefore, directly take cognisance o f the importance o f the 
entrepreneur's social capital variable and other related socio-cultural parameters, within this 
analytical set up. A more or less complete schematic representation o f this analytical 
framework is demonstrated in figure 1 below. This schematic linkage takes three major paths
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which can have positive or negative micro or small scale enterprise dynamic outcomes 
depending on whether the overall effect o f the prevailing institutional environment is both 
production and transaction costs economizing or not.
The first link, the institutional environment as rules and their enforcement mechanisms- 
exogenous incentive structure-transaction costs and firm dynamics linkage is indirect. As we 
can observe from figure 1 below, following the arrows from the formal, informal rules and 
their enforcement mechanisms boxes this link is established through the effects o f these rules 
on the exogenous incentive structure. For example if property rights, intellectual property 
rights, contract rights can only be enforced through say closed ethnic, kinship or locality-based 
social networks that swiftly provides both the required reliable information and the much 
needed trust or social identity between transacting economic agents, but at the same time 
having the potential effect o f stifling competition and acting as an entry barrier to potential 
entrants especially the mistrusted ones or those o f a different social and cultural identity such 
groups are bound to experience high transaction costs. Government strategies, economic and 
political policies, tendering rules; national and sectoral labour laws; bank lending rules; 
traditional values, etc, in situations where they are heavily weighted to benefit large enterprises 
at the expense of small ones have the same effect and therefore exposes the latter group to 
unduly high policy induced transaction costs. Together, the effects o f these social and rule 
induced costs directly feeds into the overall transaction costs incurred by transacting economic 
agents in the various markets they execute their transactions. This in turn directly determines 
the firm's decision making processes in terms of both contracting, investment and technology 
choices. All investment decisions and the actual acts of contracting, choosing technology and 
investment entails that the firm incurs some irreversible transaction or sunk costs which can be 
high or low depending on the prevailing levels o f (mis)trust, personal, institutional or 
otherwise, within the firm’s transacting environment.
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Figure 1: A schematic representation of the link between Institutions, transaction costs and small firm 
dynamics
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This in turn, goes on to determine the firm's organizational form(market, hybrid/networks, 
hierarchy or a combination) and other transaction costs economizing coping strategies, 
including cultural norms, direct communication and negotiation as coordination mechanisms. 
Organizational form on its part, in turn shapes the firm's contracting behaviour and contracting 
choices, that is simple versus complex contracting6 or a mixture o f the two which in turn 
influences the cost structure to be confronted by each firm. It is this series o f events which 
actually then influences the dynamics(growth, survival and decline) and the size o f the 
enterprise at micro level depending on whether the transaction and production costs 
experienced by each individual enterprise have a growth chocking effect or not and the actual 
magnitude of these costs experienced at the enterprise level is determined by the enterprise's 
preferred contracting choice. In cases where perceived risk and transaction or sunk costs are 
high, for example, where the negotiation, monitoring and enforcement o f property and 
contract rights is perceived to be costly for some enterprises, it may result in their lack of 
access to private and public contracts or loss o f credibility vis-a-vis banks, suppliers, 
customers, etc, or entrepreneurs themselves may deliberately limit the scale o f their 
investments and enterprise sizes as a transaction costs minimizing strategy thereby directly 
stifling the growth prospects of the enterprise through forgone increased division o f labour. 
The transmission of the effects of these transaction costs at the enterprise level are felt through 
the totality of their effects on both the enterprise's contracting costs(internaI & external) and 
production costs, as indicated by the arrows in figure 1 above. Production costs are affected 
through the choice o f technology(simple or complex) and the adopted organizational form as 
well as investment decisions at the enterprise level. For the latter case, the institutional 
environment through the incentive structure and then via transaction costs associated with 
insecure property rights giving rise to uncertainty and risk, through say lack o f title deeds; 
uncertain or unpredictable and biased macroeconomic policy measures for example customs 
and excise duties, credit ceilings, arbitrary taxation, preferential foreign exchange allocation or 
rationing, inadequate provision o f law and order, etc; local customs, practices, other socio­
cultural factors, values and beliefs, for example the negative effects o f  traditional social 
arrangements and customs or practices that penalises instead o f rewarding achievers and
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works against female entrepreneurs; combined with bad politics characterised by predatory 
and rent-seeking behaviour either by the state or other economic agents involved in the 
transacting game may act as a disincentive, by generating mistrust between potential 
contracting parties and hence directly adversely impinging on the net profitability of 
investments undertaken due to the resultant high costs o f transacting emanating from 
unchecked incentive problems for enterprises to invest in new plant and advanced growth 
enhancing technologies or simply by stifling learning thereby destining the enterprise's 
technological upgrading capabilities into a state of limbo or perpetual stagnation. 
Alternatively, in cases where high transaction costs may impede some enterprises to secure the 
requisite funds, raw materials and skills in the credit, products and labour markets 
respectively, these enterprises might find themselves not in a position again to invest in those 
production techniques requiring initially huge loan financing, special inputs and skills, further 
limiting their growth opportunities. Even the so called appropriate labour intensive production 
technologies, if they lead to high supervision or monitoring costs their chances o f being 
adopted is very minimal. This is depicted in figure 1 above by the arrow's movement from the 
transaction costs box into the enterprise's technology, capabilities and endogenous incentive 
structure box, which in turn feeds into the enterprise's internal contracting and production 
costs via the medium of transformation costs. As a chain reaction, this will ultimately also 
affect the enterprise's external contracting behaviour and the associated costs. On a positive 
note, however, the exogenous incentive structure can be a source o f dynamic traditional 
norms, values and belief systems that helps to promote mutual trust and solidarity, and 
penalises any form of strategic behaviour by transacting economic agents, therefore, directly 
acting as a restrain against both ex ante and ex post opportunism and consequently making 
contracts to become self-enforcing. This tremendously minimizes both transaction costs and 
other related sunk costs. And through the enterprise's contracting decisions and choices, this 
will positively affect the processes o f enterprise dynamics through the promotion o f beneficial 
exchange relationships, including the use o f complex contracting and therefore specialization. 
The ultimate effect is that this will positively impinge on the enterprise's total cost structure 
due to both growth enhancing price and productivity changes.
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The, second linkage is the enterprise’s technology, capabilities and endogenous incentive 
structure-transaction costs and enterprise dynamics connection. For static analysis purposes, if 
we assume that in the short run the enterprise's technology and capabilities are given then the 
enterprise's existing technology and capabilities endowments affects both transaction and 
production costs, hence enterprise behaviour and dynamics in two discernible ways. Firstly, by 
tracing the arrow from the enterprise's technology, capabilities and endogenous incentive 
structure box, an enterprise's production costs which are an internal outcome, emanates from 
the overall transformation costs which are directly determined by the enterprise's existing 
technology and capabilities endowments. Then these production costs jointly with the 
enterprise's internal contracting costs feeds into the processes o f enterprise growth, survival 
and decline as indicated by the arrows in figure 1 above. Secondly, the state o f the enterprise's 
technology, capabilities and endogenous incentive structure indirectly via transaction costs 
affects both its external and internal contracting costs and decisions, for example in cases 
where asset specificity and quality control matters, in order to minimize ex post bargaining 
costs, vertical integration will be the prefer organizational arrangement as opposed to say, 
subcontracting arrangements. Alternatively if the enterprise's technology and capabilities are 
simple and underdeveloped giving rise to huge disparity with technologies employed by other 
enterprises, the ensuing deficiencies in product quality, the narrow range o f products the 
enterprise is therefore in a position to manufacture and possibilities o f delays in meeting set 
delivery times which in turn generates high transaction costs in the form of measurement, 
monitoring and enforcement costs will adversely affect the enterprise's external contracting 
behaviour and costs including any possibilities o f creating inter-enterprise vertical integration 
production processes because o f both the enterprise's technological and cultural disconnect 
with its larger enterprise counterparts. Thus again, through this technology, capabilities and 
endogenous incentive structure-transaction costs-contracting behaviour-enterprise dynamics 
link, this chronological sequence o f events again takes us into the micro processes o f 
enterprise growth, survival and decline. However, at each point in time, transaction costs and 
related sunk costs experienced by the enterprise are directly proportional to the effects o f the 
enterprise's endogenous incentive structure composed o f its capabilities or productive 
capacities, that is organizational, managerial and social or networking capabilities and human
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resources as well as the enterprise's codified and uncodified rules and regulations which 
constitutes its own internal coordination mechanisms, including the owner's personal 
attributes, cultural values and beliefs. If the enterprise is well endowed with social capabilities 
that allows it to effectively network resulting in an extensive set o f trust enhancing information 
supply, signalling, screening and marketing contacts, with employees, suppliers, financiers, 
customers, public and private agencies, which permits it to elicit all the resources it requires it 
is bound to enjoy lower transactions costs and possibly greater productivity gains and growth. 
But in cases where internal rules and routines become inflexible and dysfunctional, social 
capabilities are underdeveloped, this promotes mistrust, both internally and externally, which 
will negatively impinge on the enterprise's dynamics by increasing both production and 
transaction costs because by not belonging to the existing social networking arrangements 
prevailing in its social and business environment, the enterprise is discriminated against. Every 
time it wants to transact, it will be made to pay more and therefore incur higher costs vis-a-vis 
other existing enterprises which are members o f the social network, in order to enjoy the same 
benefits, be it by other transacting economic agents or state agents. The general tendency is 
therefore to increase the enterprise's transaction and production costs through increased 
contracting costs, lowering the net returns on investment and ultimately negatively affecting 
enterprise growth, if not leading to decline. Therefore the utility o f the enterprise's endogenous 
incentive structure lies in its ability to align incentives that are conducive to the creation o f a 
trusting atmosphere and engenders compliance within and outside the enterprise which 
therefore goes a long way in attenuating the inevitable incentive or agency problems and the 
consequent high transaction costs emanating from incomplete contracting, moral hazard and 
adverse selection cases. In the long run, learning or accumulation o f capabilities within the 
enterprise itself, if ever it takes place, will have the same effects and the positive ripple effects 
of such learning again goes a long way towards minimizing both the enterprise's overall 
transaction and production costs by positively affecting the enterprise’s contracting behaviour 
and organizational choice.
The third and final linkage, which is direct and fits well into the schema, is the institutional 
environment as organizations-institutional support-transaction costs and enterprise dynamics
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connection. Following the arrows again, organizations both formal and indigenous ones feed 
directly into the enterprise's transaction costs box as indicated by the arrows in figure 1 above 
via these institutions' behaviour either as providers or non-providers o f both supply-side and 
demand-side institutional support services or as active users or non-users o f the enterprise's 
products which has got the same transaction and production costs increasing or decreasing 
effects as the other two linkages above. In a similar way the resultant effects will have the 
same influence on both the enterprise's contracting choices and behaviour, choice o f 
organizational form and the dynamics at the micro level. The contribution o f these institutions 
may take various forms which may include from a technical point o f view, provision o f 
expertise in assisting with the introduction o f new and improving existing manufacturing 
technologies, with the direct effect o f strengthening the technological capacities and 
competitiveness of these enterprises; skills upgrading, offering technical assistance in product 
development and diversification, testing, packaging, quality control services or product 
standardization. The latter may involve the implementation o f local and international trust 
enhancing product manufacturing standards and specifications, including environmental 
management and control systems with respect to the minimization o f water, air and soil 
pollution. Hence we can see the direction o f the arrow in figure 1 above again moving from 
the institutional support box via transaction costs into the enterprise's technology and 
capabilities box and here it affects both the enterprise's internal and external contracting costs, 
feeding into the processes o f enterprise dynamics at the micro level. All the latter services 
when provided, have a tremendous potential to reduce monitoring and measurement costs and 
thus can naturally lead to the promotion o f inter-enterprise production linkages and therefore 
enterprise growth. The same can be said with respect to the provision o f credit, market 
intelligence, marketing assistance and training in financial management skills that includes 
buying, costing, pricing, stock control, record keeping, etc, in which organizational institutions 
can take an active role in screening or guaranteeing borrowings by micro and small enterprises 
from banks and other financial institutions or these intermediary institutions themselves can act 
as direct lenders. Also subcontracting, franchising and licensing production arrangements can 
be facilitated when private sector intermediaries themselves, for example marketing 
cooperatives, brokers, traders, distributors or trade associations, with proper incentives put in
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place, take the risk to act as both quality guarantors and representatives o f these firms thereby 
getting involved in direct price negotiations, advertising, buying and selling o f these 
enterprises' products using say a common brand name. By acting at the same time as quality 
guarantors they will be therefore bridging the notoriously lacking properly constituted 
signalling mechanisms. This means that it will be these organizations' role, in addition to 
capacity building, to link up micro and small enterprises with key national or international 
distribution channels and monitor the quality o f products and their prices and ensure their 
reliability through timeous delivery o f orders to customers or replacement o f rejected items. 
These institutions will also therefore have to perform the task o f penalizing their affiliate 
producers if they supply shoddy products. The aim of all this, being to enhance the visibility o f 
the micro and small enterprises’ products through direct negotiations and cooperation with 
formal distribution channels' management to grant display and shelf space to these enterprises' 
products in their show rooms and retailing chains. This also calls for the provision and setting 
up o f less expensive and time consuming contract enforcement and dispute resolution services.
Alternatively, these organizations can either commit themselves to the preferential awarding of 
both public and private contracts to these enterprises, thus creating a captive market for their 
products or foster the creation o f organizational forms that promotes economies o f scale 
through the encouragement o f collaboration and networking behaviour amongst micro and 
small enterprises themselves for example clustering, although these arrangements demand a 
high degree of trust especially of the generalized type that needs to be nurtured continuously, 
goodwill and cooperation amongst these clustering economic agents hence the need to put in 
place the appropriate incentives to overcome the likely problems to arise from the incentive to 
free ride and the obvious social and cultural barriers. Collaboration, including group based 
ownership and use of production equipment, resource pulling arrangements, bulk input 
purchases and output sales, etc, as a means o f attaining economies o f  scale can also help them 
to establish the much needed reputation, goodwill and credibility o f their products and 
enterprises thereby broadening their marketing options and profit opportunities. Therefore, the 
creation o f these stable, long lasting business relationships and networks can enable the 
generation o f mass markets and the attainment o f economies o f  scale which would otherwise
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not be available to these micro and small enterprises in their natural atomistic form of 
existence by lowering both transportation and communication costs, for example. Such 
behaviour and many other information brokering and infrastructure upgrading activities will 
assist in influencing the allocation o f risk between the transacting enterprises and the 
intermediary organizations involved. Therefore, institutional support may actually lower both 
transaction and production costs and the risks encountered by transacting micro and small 
scale enterprises thereby determining and positively influencing both the choice o f  technique, 
organizational form, contracting decisions and behaviour at the enterprise level. This process 
can be traced by following the arrows through the transaction costs box in figure 1 above 
down to the enterprise level again and it may be enterprise growth friendly if transaction costs 
are kept to a minimum. The converse is true.
However, in relation to all the above three linkages it can be said that transaction costs are 
generally higher and risk abounds when both personal and institutional trust is lacking, 
therefore stifling enterprise growth because the incentive structure will be uncertain, especially 
with respect to the stability o f property rights, and if facilitative institutional support is not 
forthcoming. Therefore, what is crucial above all it seems, with respect to micro and small 
enterprise dynamics in such high risk transaction environment(s) and contract uncertainty, is 
the availability of trusting behaviour or simply the existence o f a trusting atmosphere between 
transacting agents themselves and their solid faith in other institutions which are part and 
parcel o f their overall institutional environment, state or private institutions, that supports the 
exchange process through their function o f constantly checking on both ex ante and ex post 
opportunism. In this case trust and therefore the transacting economic agent's identity 
becomes the necessary and sufficient condition that helps to minimize the diversion o f scarce 
resources towards the protection o f property rights and in turn ensures stable expanding 
markets, mutual beneficial exchange and hence positive outcomes with respect to enterprise 
dynamics. But, it is important to take cognizant o f the fact that with respect to trust-based 
social networks and related informal contracting processes, whilst trust may be high and 
localized, within these small homogenous groups o f transacting economic agents resulting in 
lower transaction costs and risk, which give rise to a number o f positive externalities due to
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exchange or allocative efficiency within the group(s), low trust between heterogenous groups 
o f transacting economic agents implies that contracting or exchange relationships between 
these groups may be susceptible to varying degrees of exchange or production inefficiencies 
and thus breeding some kind of negative externalities, due to the resultant high transaction 
costs and a dearth of resource and risk pooling mechanisms including the emergence o f such 
organizational forms like partnerships, joint ventures, strategic alliances or consortiums, 
emanating from lack o f a common system of contracting practices or a desired pattern of 
social behaviourial relations between them. The low levels o f trust between groups effectively 
stifles the free flow of information across these groups resulting in diverse adverse impacts 
with also varying degrees o f severity on the processes o f micro and small scale enterprise 
dynamics. Therefore, contrary to what traditional microeconomic theory say, that is the 
universal prevalence o f an unfettered and non-discriminatory impersonal market exchange 
system, in this analytical framework it seems that both exchange and production relationships 
are also determined by the existing within group endogenous non-price informal institutional 
arrangements or practices and statistical discrimination may be pervasive. These social 
relationships serve to exclusively restrict contracting or exchange to a few selected and 
preferred economic agents or small homogenous groups o f economic agents. The exclusionary 
or discriminatory nature o f these institutional arrangements or practices can only be rationally 
justified on the grounds o f their transaction costs economizing and risk spreading or pooling 
fiinction(s). And as long as the opportunity costs o f  exclusion remain lower than the costs o f 
transacting across heterogenous groups, the within group exchange arrangements will rein 
supreme and therefore flourish forever. But as we have already highlighted the efficiency o f 
the whole internal trade or contracting process may suffer from such "lock in" effects with 
micro and small scale enterprises absorbing most o f these non-growth promoting adverse 
effects.
6. The Indonesian SMEs Assistance Model and its Applicability to Zimbabwe.
In this section, in light o f the above theoretical insights, we are going to discuss a few selected 
success stories o f innovative SMEs transaction costs economizing and trust or market
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enhancing institutional arrangements from Indonesia initiated both by private and public 
organizations. We will start by analyzing its rural micro-finance project, the Unit Desai system; 
briefly discuss the complementary marketing strategies and then draw some lessons for 
Zimbabwe.
6.1. The Unit Desai Rural Banking System7
Whilst a number SMEs support programmes have been implemented in Indonesia, what has 
achieved real success and therefore drawn the world's attention is its innovative grass-roots 
level semi-formal institution, the unit Desai rural banking system. The latter are village-level 
savings and loan associations and is run by Bank Rakyat Indonesia(BRI) one o f the five state 
owned banks in Indonesia responsible for marshalling financial resources for rural 
development. The Bank Rakyat Indonesia's Unit Desai system currently serves 2.5 million 
micro-loan clients and 12 million small savers through the bank’s 3600 rural offices or Unit 
Desas and at least 85% of loans granted are for working capital loans(CGAP). The 
organization o f each unit Desas is based on a simple four person structure, a general manager, 
a loan officer, a cashier and a bookkeeper but can increase staff up to a maximum o f ten. The 
bank's lending methodologies are strongly built and anchored on existing known informal 
financial mechanisms and strong social structures, namely group cohesion, at the village level 
which allows the system to reach large numbers o f micro-loan clients. Therefore, the latter's 
success emanates from the fact that these institutions were provided with a simple but 
innovative lending technology for increasing the likelihood of payment under the group-based 
or individual-based incentive lending schemes. The group scheme is very much similar to the 
solidarity-group lending methodology pioneered by Grameen Bank. This involves organizing 
clients into groups o f five individuals and making loans to two group members at a time, on a 
staggered basis, with all five group members jointly reliable for repayment. Whilst under the 
individual incentive scheme, these innovations consists o f discounts and other incentives for 
those who repay their loans on time, performance incentives such as profit related bonuses for 
bank employees and repayment related bonuses for the village-level community leaders who 
act as character referees for borrowers, therefore assisting with the speeding up and 
simplification o f the loan appraising system. All borrowers who make every loan payment
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promptly are free to request a second loan which will be twice the previous one. Late 
payments implies that the next loan amount will be made smaller than the previous one. If 
repayments are made two months after the expire date, then the borrower will not be eligible 
for another loan(Reed el al, 1994).
However, under each of the above schemes portfolio risk management is implemented through 
the granting of small initial loan amounts, but incrementally raised after each and every 
successful repayment o f the previous one. And in order to further reinforce the latter pressures 
or incentives, loan instalments are collected every week at or near the borrower's premises, a 
move which cuts tremendously on borrowers' transport costs. At the same time, in both 
schemes borrowers are required to pull a small amount o f savings either as a group or 
individual fund. The latter fund acts also as an insurance fund, thereby generating an 
innovative substitute for the imperfect or non-existent rural insurance market. Therefore, 
according to Mosley(1995) largely as a result o f the effectiveness o f this technology, 
repayment rates on the loans made by the Indonesian BRI Unit Desai institutions are extremely 
high-over 97%, or far in excess of what is achieved by commercial banks throughout Asia. 
The secret o f this unsurpassed success lies with the provision o f a much simplified and low- 
cost lending technology for making the rural capital market work more efficiently under 
uncertainty, viz either by the practice o f lending to groups o f borrowers o f which no other 
member of the group is allowed to receive an additional loan whilst still any other member of 
the group is still in arrears or has defaulted, so that the pressure to repay o f group members is 
added to that emanating from the lender or through the individual incentive scheme in which 
default can lead to loss o f benefits and future chances to borrow, hence the desired to preserve 
one's self-interests also become a compelling factor to honouring one's debts. Therefore, in 
each of the latter options it is either the group or individual incentive scheme institutional 




However, it is always true that any credit programme intended for micro and small scale 
enterprises often fail to achieve the desired results if its design does not take into account the 
pull effects o f effective demand either on the domestic or international market. In Indonesia, 
they did not loose sight o f the latter issue. A coherent marketing strategy to cater for both the 
domestic and export market which involved the forging o f strategic alliances between small 
scale producers, private domestic and international marketing organisations or buyers was put 
in place. Extensive use o f consultancy services was made use o f in the areas o f quality 
improvement, covering quality control systems, packaging and labelling, creation o f new 
designs, etc. But specifically for the rural enterprises, traders played an important middleman 
role and there is quite well documented proof on how the Indonesian rural entrepreneurs 
depended on wider markets which these middlemen made accessible to them(Weijland, 1990). 
These trade networks also acted as a conduit o f market intelligence, input supply and finance 
provision. Therefore, the transfer o f buyer-seller relationships managed to occur at the firm- 
to-firm level within the context o f well defined market channels. Unlike with other marketing 
arrangements that involve third parties as intermediaries which often results in the 
institutionalization o f lack o f trust between transacting parties, the Indonesian strategy of 
deliberately promoting SMEs trading networks allowed trust to be nurtured bit-by-bit and 
later on develop and flourish. A study by Berry and Levy(1994) confirmed this. Their study 
found that any aggressive efforts to seek out buyers and match them with suppliers do not pay 
off. Instead it was confirmed that firms value services where they can develop private-to- 
private or face-to-face transactions, such as trade fairs organized either locally or abroad. 
Hence the study concluded that micro and small scale entrepreneurs must be encouraged to 
establish and maintain their own trade networks as it has proved to be very successful in some 
parts of Indonesia.
6.3. Relevance of the Model to Zimbabwe
As to whether the above analyzed Indonesian lending methodologies and marketing strategies 
as transaction costs economizing institutional arrangements can be applicable to the 
Zimbabwean situation, will all depend to a large extend on the country's prevailing institutional
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setting. Firstly, the success o f stimulating small rural banks depends to a large extent on the 
confidence of the public in those banks, because all markets and especially the financial 
markets need some minimum volumes o f trust in order for them to function properly. In order 
to prevent bank failures the Zimbabwean Reserve Bank will have to come up with appropriate 
prudential banking rules and to monitor closely the soundness o f these rural banks and the 
quality o f their management because it could be true that the recent Indonesian financial crisis 
could have been also triggered partly by the lax monitoring of its financial system. Secondly, 
the financial authorities and government may stimulate the establishment o f small rural banks 
through selective intervention in various areas. This can be done by improving the investment 
climate in the field of small rural private banks and by setting up government-initiated projects 
such as the Unit Desai system, provided that requisite conditions for viability and sustainability 
are observed. With respect to the latter the good news about Zimbabwe is that the 
infrastructure that can be adapted for the purpose of either implementing the group or 
individual based incentive lending schemes is already there.
1. As a first option, the Unit Desai system can be accomplished by simply changing the 
mandate of say all rural Post Office Savings Banks(POSB) which are already strategically 
located on all the country's growth points by adding the lending portfolio to them given the 
fact that these rural entrepreneurs have already some extensive experiences in banking with 
this institution. In fact for the majority o f them, that is the only place where the much sort after 
information about their credit or banking histories can be easily found.
2. Like the POSB, the Small Enterprise Development Corporation(SEDCO) is a good 
candidate for the Unit Desai type o f banking arrangement, but unlike the POSB its mandate 
can be extended to cover savings mobilization. By simply extending and increasing its branch 
network into the rural areas and getting the incentives right, direct savings mobilization could 
be one of the best solutions to SEDCO's perennial undercapitalization problem. Moreover 
SEDCO by 1994 had already started experimenting with its micro-enterprise group lending 
scheme, of which if it succeeds can tremendously bring down monitoring costs and possibly 
improve on repayment performance.
3. Alternatively, the Agricultural Finance Corporation(AFC) also given its long history and 
experience of working closely with communal farmers, like these Indonesian rural banks before
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their restructuring in early 1984, can be urged to diversify its lending portfolio in order to 
directly take on board the borrowing requirements of rural micro and small scale 
entrepreneurs. The AFC also has some substantial working experience of its group lending 
scheme to communal farmers, therefore it will be to its best advantage to consolidate and 
capitalize on this knowledge and design similar micro and small scale entrepreneurs' lending 
groups that utilize existing grass roots social links and institutions that tend to foster and 
sustain group cohesion and trust.
Once initiated and the project starts running the above institutions can be gradually enticed or 
provided with additional incentives to offer non-financial services such as retail outlet facilities 
for the products of their clients, performing the market intelligence function, etc in order to 
make their support programmes become multi-pronged and therefore real integrated ones. It 
will be an added advantage if bank staff can also be recruited from within the localities, such 
that in addition to the possibility of offering them lower wages they will be having first hand 
information about their potential loan clients. But above all the latter may help in overcoming 
the "elitist" attitude of most urban-based bank officials thereby instilling some confidence and 
trust in the minds of local borrowers as they will feel very free to interact with the locally 
recruited bank employees. Local information and the knowledge about the identity o f local 
borrowers that will be imbedded in these locally recruited employees will therefore help in 
identify the ex ante risks associated with prospective borrowers. Hence the problem of 
borrower anonymity, which underlies most adverse selection cases will therefore be 
minimized.
The last option, which is really an empowerment option will be for the government with the 
assistance o f provincial, district and local community leaders to encourage the formation of 
rural banking cooperatives. And this implies that some form o f government support in the 
form of start-up capital and administrative costs subsidies may be necessary. The subsidy is no 
surprise because although the Indonesian system is now being run on a commercial basis, 
initially it also heavily benefited from both government and private sector financial and non- 
financial support. However, with the passage o f time we expect these institutions to become
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self-sustaining from the savings they will be mobilizing. But what must be made clear and 
therefore emphasised is that the Indonesian micro-finance program succeed mainly because the 
incentive system was made to be right and therefore conducive to all borrowers, savers, bank 
employees and community leaders alike and also the political will was there to sincerely 
empower the disadvantaged. These are very important prerequisite for any country that may 
contemplate experimenting with the Unit Desai Indonesian micro-finance model.
As far as marketing is concerned, there is no doubt that micro and small enterprises in 
Zimbabwe face a severe handicap in this area and what we can learnt from Indonesia is its 
systematic efforts towards helping its SMEs in setting up quality production standards, 
offering quality control and packaging and labelling assistance. Therefore, in the Zimbabwean 
case it will make more sense if the Standards Association o f Zimbabwe(SAZ) which hitherto 
has been offering its services only to large firms can be encouraged to decentralize its 
certification marking scheme and testing activities to all provincial centres in the country, 
where they may be readily accessible to rural based SMEs whilst at the same time making 
some concerted effort to reach all urban based SMEs with its services. Product testing and the 
consequent certification by SAZ, on its own will greatly enhance the marketability o f the 
Products of SMEs given the fact that they would have been manufactured under an effective 
system of testing, control and monitoring which guarantees product quality, safety and 
reliability. There is no other effective way of signalling, promoting inter-firm production 
linkages, enhancing competitiveness or bridging the technical needs gap o f the micro and small 
enterprises than the latter arrangements.
The above must be then supplemented by the continued hosting o f national and provincial 
annual or bi-annual Small Business Expos specifically designed to cater for micro and small 
scale entrepreneurs where they can have a chance to exhibit their old and new products 
thereby enhancing their visibility. The latter can also be carried out as a way o f promoting 
business networking and the establishment o f enduring trust based exchange relationships with 
both their new customers and suppliers. But the problem with the latter arrangements as we 
have indicated in section 2 above, is that most rural entrepreneurs are often ignorant o f such
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exhibitions for reasons we have already specified in that section. Therefore, the existence o f 
such shows must be extensively publicized in order to reach the often neglected rural 
entrepreneurs.
However, although in this paper we did not select any Indonesian case on skill training in the 
SME sector the labour problems, especially the shortage o f skilled labour, faced by the small 
scale entrepreneur in Zimbabwe can be summed up as a serious conundrum always ready to 
unfold itself as a double tragedy in which whilst the more experienced employees in the firm 
become difficult to supervise and the entrepreneur can no longer trust them and at the same 
time is not in a position to accommodate their grievances and try to retain them by paying 
them the requisite wages, (s)he cannot at the same time attract other outside non-kin group 
skilled employees into the firm for basically the same reasons. Any efforts toward in-house 
training besides their weak resource capacity to do so, is further hampered by the non-firm 
specific nature o f the skills acquired during the training process which makes it very difficult 
for entrepreneurs to recoup their training costs fully. Therefore, due to the latter pervasive 
incentive problem in particular and the public good nature o f skills acquired during training, 
the government can therefore act as a catalyst say through the offer o f a training subsidy in 
order to stimulate establishment of provincial and district level privately run, low-cost and 
demand-driven training centres to serve rural SMEs in different subsectors o f the 
manufacturing sector.
Lastly, an additional area that need to be urgently addressed although not raised under the 
Indonesian model is the need to strengthen existing appropriate local contract enforcement 
mechanisms as an interim solution towards the enhancement o f SMEs contracting 
opportunities. The problems of non and late payment are pervasive and most micro and small 
scale entrepreneurs are loosing a lot o f their revenues this way. From fieldwork discussions it 
was made quite explicit that it was very costly and therefore uneconomic to engage lawyers 
and higher order courts, whilst for those who sought help from the local community court 
system not much help was forthcoming. The problem with the latter is that the presiding 
officers who man these local courts are ignorant o f formal contract law and at the same time
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are not well versed with the informal contracting and general business practices of these 
entrepreneurs. Therefore it is difficult for them to come up with properly constituted dispute 
resolution mechanisms and most o f their verdicts are made on the basis of ex post fairness 
grounds that permits the defendant not to adequately compensate the plaintiff. So, it will be a 
good idea if the Small Claims Court system currently confined to large urban centres can also 
be decentralize to cover small towns and rural growth points and its law officers must make an 
effort to acquire basic first hand knowledge about the business practices o f micro and small 
scale entrepreneurs in order for them to function effectively.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we have attempted to highlight theoretically some o f the major types and sources 
of transaction costs found in the products, credit and labour markets and how they are 
interconnected with the processes o f micro and small scale enterprise dynamics. We have also 
picked specific Indonesian institutions as case studies on how they were utilized to overcome 
and minimize the adverse impacts o f these costs and analyzed their relevance to Zimbabwe in 
terms of what organizational arrangements can be adapted to perform the same functions 
However, what all the above discussions may entail is the need to establish a coordinating 
institution made up of people from government, the private sector and real representatives of 
micro and small scale entrepreneurs at the grass roots level. This may involve, for example, the 
establishment of an advisory service scheme if one is not yet in place which will be tasked with 
the responsibility of constantly identifying the problems faced by micro and small 
entrepreneurs. This implies that they will be a need to make frequent field trips to meet micro 
and small scale entrepreneurs in order to elicit and probe specific problems they will be 
confronting and thereafter providing them with appropriate instant solutions and extension 
services that includes monitoring and making evaluations for any progress that may be taking 
place. Although in our case study we did not say anything substantial pertaining to the role the 
macroeconomic policy environment on enterprise dynamics, our schematic presentation is 
quite explicit on the influence o f such policies on SMEs birth, growth, survival and decline 
processes. Therefore, whilst there is a need to plug the cited institutional gaps, their 
effectiveness in further enhancing the contracting opportunities o f rural micro and small scale
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entrepreneurs will only be achieved if complementary supportive or transaction costs 
economizing macro-policies are also put in place. If this can be achieved the probability is very 
high that SMEs in Zimbabwe can start to actively assume their rightful role and therefore start 
to meaningfully contribute towards the country's development process.
32
N o tes
1 .For a more detailed discussion on the measurement problems of these types of transaction costs see 
North(1990).
2.Lack of communication infrastructure is more severe in the rural areas o f the whole of Sub-Saharan 
Africa, with for example 0.48 telephone per 100 people in Sub-Saharan Africa when compared with 60 
per 100 people in the USA. The Zimbabwe rural economy is no exception to this.
3. For an early analysis of transaction costs in the credit market see Adams, Dale W and G.I 
Nehman(1979) and on recent empirical work see Zia U Ahmed(1989)
4. Conceptually the distinction we make here between the institutional environment and institutional 
arrangements is more in line with Williamson's(1994) approach in which the former is treated as a more 
macroanahtic perspective concerned with the political and legal rules of the game and the latter is 
considered to be a more microanahtic perspective dealing with firm and market modes of contract and 
organization. It is important to note that in this paper our definition of the institutional environment is 
much broader than Williamson's rules definition.
5. For additional literature on trust, especially on how it is differently defined or generated and sustained 
see in particular Luhmann(1979), Zuckerf 1986), Sako(1992). Williamson(1993), Dasgupta(1988) and 
for more rational choice inspired explanations see Kreps(1990)
6. A detailed distinction between simple and complex contracting can be found in North(1990) and 
Williamson(1985)
7. A more detailed historical picture of the origins of the Indonesian rural b a n k in g  s y s te m  c a n  
b e  f o u n d  i n  S c h m i t ( 1 9 9 1 )
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